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1.  Introduction
The sudden failure of many banks and the assumption, by the authorities, of some or all
of their obligations can place a huge burden on the budget.  The first-best response to this
risk is for the monetary authorities to have a robust regulatory regime for the banking and
financial sectors so that the scale of failures is limited by an incentive structure that
reduces the incidence of bad banking and through early intervention of the authorities in
failing banks.  But what if the first-best policy fails?  How can the fiscal authorities best
position themselves to minimize undue pressure on the budget from the financial sector?
What estimates can be made of the possible magnitude of such pressures and of when
they will crystallize? What contingency planning is necessary, whether in terms of pre-
funding or in terms of a decision-tree for which potential expenditure obligations should
be explicitly assumed?  What is the best way of phasing the cash impact on the budget of
the assumed liabilities?
This paper reviews the issues and suggests a methodology for fiscal planning in the face
of these substantial risks.  Three main objectives are suggested for this exercise.  First,
protection of small depositors, limitation of adverse effects on confidence and on the
functioning of the payments system.  Second, minimization of fiscal costs, both by
reducing moral hazard and by limiting the fiscal impact of any given banking losses.
Third, insulating the remainder of the fiscal process, as far as possible, from disruption
caused by a surge in banking losses: thus smoothing the impact on tax rates and on other
expenditures.  Evidently we are here at the junction of banking and fiscal policy.  The
goal of this paper is to explore the role of the fiscal authority at this junction: accordingly
we omit reference to many important banking policy aspects which are of less direct
relevance to fiscal concerns.
When the banking failures are part of a wider financial and economic crash, the budget
will also suffer indirectly from the operation of automatic stabilizers, as the economic
downturn weakens tax revenue and increases social protection expenditures.  Though
important, this indirect aspect is not considered here.
The paper is organized as follows.  In section 2 we review the different ways in which the
fiscal authorities have responded to banking crises in the past.  Section 3 outlines some
requirements for institutional preparedness, and the decision tree that should be traversed
in the onset of a crisis.  Section 4 describes some of the main approaches that have been
adopted in the literature to the question of early warning of banking crises.  Section 5
clarifies the concepts of scale, probability and timing which we propose to use (there is
more detail on this in Appendix 1). As a prelude to the practical methodology being
proposed, Section 6 describes some of the main factors that influence the scale of bank
losses.  Section 7 sets out our practical, but formal, method for quantifying the expected
value of the potential fiscal liability.  Section 8 presents a numerical example of thisframework in practice.  Section 9 briefly discusses the phasing of the cash impact (in the
budget including through the use of financial instruments.  Section 10 concludes.
2.  Past experience
Governments do nct always assume the liabilities of failed banks.  Even in the case' of
large failures, such as that of the BCCI bank, industrial country governments can and do
choose to allow depositors to absorb the losses.  In many cases lengthy delays in
compensating depositors, or rescheduling their claims by conversion into long-tern
government obligations, have effectively imposed costs on depositors even if the
nominal deposit is eventually repaid.  This has been the experience in cases as different
as Guinea and Thailand, for exarnple, in the mid-1980s.'  Nevertheless, whether because
they fear widespread economic convulsion due to the collapse of the payments systl m, or
a generalized loss of confidence, governments more often do assume the liabilities of
failed banks, even extending cover to large depositors and foreign lenders.
Estimates of the costs of past banking failures range up to about 40 per cent of one..year's
GNP (for Chile). It is anticipated that a substantial part of the costs of the recent Ea3t
Asian crisis - now projected in the region of 20-55 per cent of GDP for the three worst-
affected countries - will ultimately fall on the budget.  Estimates as of 1996 of
cumulative resolution costs for Developing and Transition economies in the order of $S250
billion in these countries have been overtaken by events. The projected costs from five East
Asian crisis countries (including Korea) alone add more than $200 billion, and upward
revisions in relation to the earlier problems in Brazil and Mexico would bring the total to
well over $500 billion. 2
Such figures point to a problem that is difficult to absorb in normal budgetary arithlnetic.
The sudden arrival of a huge lump-sum charge on the budget, often with only limite  d
possibility for deferral of the spending over time, can have wider psychological anc.
political impacts, such as potentially derailing a medium-term fiscal strategy, creatilg  a
confidence-based collapse in foreign exchange markets. Indeed, the prospect of having to
cope with additional expenditure of several percentage points of GDP often has the eiffect
inducing policy-malkers  to delay dealing with the crisis in a comprehensive manner,
adopting instead temaporary  palliatives.
Countries have generally dealt with this problem in one of four different ways.
First,  by brushing it under the carpet, i.e. doing nothing in the hope that the problein will
go away.  Although this is generally the worst approach, it is also the most commor.
While it is undoubtedly true that the fiscal liability should not exceed what is social y
' See Baer  and Klingebiel  (1995)  for some  historical  accounts  of experience  with unccmpensated
depositors.
2 Adding  recent  - somewhat  speculative  - projections  for the latent costs  in the Chinese  banking  sysi  ern
would  bring  the total  to $1 trillion: The most comprehensive  set of historical  estimates  is in Caprio ndl
Klingebiel (1997),  See also Honohan (1997).  The estimates for East Asia are from Deutsche Bank
Research (1998).
2optimal for the authorities to assume, that does not mean postponing decisions on how to
deal with the problem until one has the resources to pay off depositors.  Allowing banks
to function in an insolvent or undercapitalized condition has been shown to deepen the
hole.
Second, the inflation tax.  By meeting the balance sheet deficit of banks through an
expansion of central bank credit, the authorities are accepting the inevitability of a sharp
increase in inflation which will have the effect of reducing the real value of depositos'
funds (including that of the depositors of the banks that have not failed).  This approach
also imposes losses on holders of cash (bank notes) and on pensioners and others in
receipt of incomes which are fixed in cash terms.  A windfall gain is imposed on debtors.
The inflationary solution thus resolves the problem without directly impacting the budget,
but at the cost of arbitrary redistributions.  The surge in inflation, and inevitably
accompanying currency depreciation, is also likely to have adverse effects on business
and investor confidence.  This solution, which was, in effect, adopted in most of the
transition economies in the early 1990s, is a disorderly one which addresses few if any of
the above-mentioned objectives in a satisfactory way.
Third, by making advance provision, typically through the establishment of a deposit
insurance fund.  The resources on which such funds can draw may be notional (invested
in unmarketable government obligations) or "funded" (e.g. invested in external
obligations).  The insurance fund's income is usually a levy on covered intermediaries
varying with the amount insured and sometimes with the assessed riskiness of the
intermediary's activities.  Many of the insurance funds that are in place have been
established in the aftermath of a major crisis and their pre-funding has typically been
inadequate to meet the demands of large or systemic crises.  In the case of the US
Savings and Loan crisis, the inadequate scale of the resources available to the insurance
fund, and of its borrowing authority, has been held responsible for inducing the fund's
managers to adopt resolution strategies that ultimately increased the overall fiscal cost
while postponing its explicit recognition. 3
Apart from its fiscal role, thepros  and cons of establishment of a deposit insurance fund
is debated by banking specialists.  On the one hand it weakens the incentive for
depositors to monitor the banks, and can greatly exacerbate the moral hazard of risk-
taking bankers for whom it provides access to low-cost deposit funding regardless of the
risks they assume.  This risk can be partly mitigated by other measures designed to
provide banks with an incentive to stay in business and by effective prudential
supervision.  On the other hand it can underpin depositor confidence and help support the
development of the banking system.  Both positive and negative aspects here are only
relevant to the extent that the government's promises are credible.
The fourth way in which fiscal authority may respond is by meeting the crisis when it
occurs.  This typically involves three elements: (i) assuming some or all of the
3 Thus the insurance fund packaged the sale and assumption arrangements whereby insolvent institutions
were disposed of in such a way as to give the purchasing institutions tax write-offs valuable to them but
costly to the budget (White, 1991). Similar problems may now be emerging in Argentina.
3obligations of  the affected banks; (ii) restraining interventions into the management of
the banks, sometimes including temporary nationalization; (iii) adopting measures to
recover as much as possible of the delinquent loans and other impaired assets, often
including the establishment of dedicated asset management or recovery companies partly
independent of the failing banks.  The precise design of the financial arrangements
established between the government and the failed bank in order to restore the solvency
of the latter can greatly influence the success of loan recovery, the incentive for more
prudent behavior by the bank in future and the stability of the government's own finances.
It has been suggested that the large fiscal cost reported for the Chilean crisis was
exacerbated by the dlesign  of the compensation mechanisms put in place for the banlcs,
which enabled these to draw-down funds from the government over many years.  Early
hopes that these funds would be repaid from subsequent profits were not realized.  On the
other hand, the famous success of the Swedish asset management companies (helped, to
be sure, by an exogenous economic upturn) reduced the net budgetary impact of their
banking crisis to a firaction  of what appeared at first (Dziobek and Pazarba,ioglu,  1997).
Credibility of government's plans
Beyond a certain point, the government's willingness or ability to deliver on large
promises will be undlermined. Large crises can overwhelm pre-arranged plans, and
greatly narrow the options of government.  Lack of credibility will, in particular,
undermine the effecliveness of deposit insurance schemes (as well as their adverse side-
effects).  It will also mean that promises to make good a deficiency over a period of time
may not be believed, so that any interventions have to be made promptly in cash.
Official market intervention.
Not to be neglected iLn  the general context of fiscal or quasi-fiscal measures to alleviAite
financial crisis are tlhe  costs of intervention in the stock market to support share pricts
and in the foreign exchange market to support the external value of the currency.  A tbrd
related type of cost - less evident - can be incurred when the government or central l arik
is a net borrower from the system at high levels of interest rates induced by policy.  'rlhere
can be various motivations for such market intervention, but defending the banking
system from losses is often an important consideration. Calculating the fiscal costs :)f
such intervention is not easy, even ex post.  Brief bursts of foreign exchange market
intervention before a,  devaluation are the easiest to cost: the September 1992 ERM
exchange rate crisis led to very substantial quasi-fiscal losses to the authorities in Ireland,
Sweden and the United Kingdom, as the domestic currency which they bought from the
market in large volwnes soon depreciated sharply in international value. 4
When they are being made, these market interventions can seem to be (and are often
represented as) costless in expected value terms in that they are undertaken at marke.
4 Note the important  distinction  between  the total loss  of foreign  exchange  reserves  and the much sm;  ller
quasi-fiscal loss which is - roughly speaking - the former multiplied by the percentage depreciation o:' the
currency. For one such e  stimate  see Honohan  (1  994).
4rates, and as such may result in gains as easily as losses.  However, large interventions
usually see the authorities alone on one side of the market: as such they are dealing in
prices far from what would be determined by a private equilibrium. Furthermore, they
may be buying from speculators whose existing open positions make it too risky for them
to sell more, even though their expectation is of additional gains.  Thus substantial market
intervention (whether in foreign exchange, domestic financial markets or the stock
exchange) involves both an expected loss, and a heightened risk to the authorities.
Liquidity crises vs. solvency crises.
A liquidity crisis that does not impair the solvency of the financial system should be met
by financial policy that does not draw on the budget. For example, a crisis of depositor
confidence may not be justified by the underlying balance sheet position of the bank.  If
so, the panic can be met by temporary liquidity loans, which would be reversed when
confidence was restored and the true health of the banks revealed.  This indeed was the
pattern observed in 19th Century Britain.  Of course, judging a crisis to be one of liquidity
rather than solvency is often little more than wishful thinking.  In recent years, banking
problems have more often proved to be worse than at first believed.  Furthermore, central
banks have not proved able to prevent a speculative attacks on fixed exchange rates from
driving these rates to new low equilibria that made predictions of banking collapse self-
fulfilling. Nevertheless, it may be that the increased frequency of banking crises in recent
years has oversensitized investors to the risk of banking losses and that temporary
liquidity assistance by a well-informed central bank will be enough to see off some future
runs.  In that case fiscal liabilities will not arise.
3.  Preparing for the crisis: the decision tree
The first and most important task for preparing a fiscal strategy is to develop a clear
decision tree covering the eventualities that might lead to undertaking fiscal obligations.
In practice, most of the fiscal liabilities that arise are not strictly contingent obligations in
any legally binding way. Instead, they are obligations assumed under pressure of
circumstances, and often without time for much consideration.  It may well be that
decisions taken under such conditions will not be optimal.  In particular, the assumption
by government of open-ended guarantees in the middle of a currency or banking crisis is
often done without sufficient consideration of the potential magnitudes involved and of
the alternatives available.  Particularly unsatisfactory is a situation where the
government's credibility and creditworthiness decline sharply because it assumes
obligations which market participants do not believe can be met.  Such a credibility
penalty can greatly increase the servicing cost of debt, as well as introducing a large risk
premium into all local currency denominated borrowing, including that of the private
sector.
In order to avoid this kind of rushed and sub-optimal policy, it is well to establish
procedural arrangements and decision-making capacity that can allow a smooth and
orderly assessment of evolving risks, despite the speed with which they evolve.  In this
5section we consider first the institutional arrangements that the fiscal authority should
have in place for this purpose.  We then outline the decision tree that needs to be
traversed as the fiscal authority considers what liabilities to assume.
3.1  Institutional arrangements  for  the  fiscal authority
Although the central bank, the superintendancy of banks and other specialized agencies
should embody the chief sources of financial market expertise and advice to government,
it is desirable that the Treasury should retain an independent capacity in this field.  Such
a capacity will be invaluable at times of crisis when the narrow focus of the specialized
financial regulators may induce them to advocate fiscal bail-outs of financial institutions
and their creditors even when the advantages of doing so fall well short of the social
costs.  Here is an instance where independence of these specialized regulatory entities,
and the assignment to each of specific responsibilities, very desirable in general, displays
some drawbacks: since each of these entities may have a very specific remit, their advice
on fiscal matters carmot necessarily be accepted by the fiscal authorities without scriutiny.
Ensuring an indeperndent  capacity will involve assigning this responsibility to a
department head within the Treasury.  The tasks of this department will include training
of relevant officials and the establishment of informal links with private sector markel
participants with the specific purpose of obtaining an independent source of information
about financial market sentiment.
In addition, the Treasury should establish a standing mechanism allowing it to be aware
of and to pool the information and perceptions of the specialized official regulatory
agencies in the financial field in regard to financial market developments which wol.d(l
have an impact on thie  budget.  The agencies involved would include the central bank, the
superintendancy of banks, the securities and exchange commission, the insurance
regulator and cognate bodies.  The precise modalities of this standing mechanism will
depend on country circumstances, but could take the form of a standing inter-agency
committee meeting, say, monthly to review recent developments. At times of crisis, the
frequency of meetings would naturally increase and the defacto  representation would
become more senior.,  but the pre-existence of such a committee would greatly facilitaitc
the flow of information in the crisis and, by establishing working relationships betwl,  en
the agencies, would avoid many of the communications failures to which governmmeLt  is
especially prone at such times.
It is to be expected that the specialized agencies, especially the central bank, may vie;  w
the establishment of such an inter-agency committee with some suspicion, fearing that it
might represent an altempt by the Treasury to control the activities of the agencies aiid to
compromise the independent mandate which they may have been given.  To ensure l he
effective functioning of the committee, the conduct of its business by the Treasury s]  lould
be in accordance with an explicit terms of reference that meets these concerns.
63.2  The decision tree
When the crisis hits, the Treasury will have to decide what commitments to assume.  If
there is an explicit deposit insurance fund, drawings on this fund to make good the losses
of insured depositors likely do not require any new approval by the fiscal authorities.  But
they could have an impact on the government finances insofar as the insurance fund
needs to liquidate government bonds or promissory notes to obtain cash to pay
depositors.  If these securities are marketable, then the fund may sell them on the open
market, and there may not be an adverse effect on interest rates, especially to the extent
that the recipients of cash redeposit the cash in another bank.  If the securities are not
marketable, there is an immediate cash call on the budget.  How this is best met is briefly
discussed in Section 9 below.
Any sizable crisis will frequently cause claims on the deposit insurance fund to exceed
the resources available to it.  Here again, depending on the legislation underlying the
deposit insurance fund, the government may have undertaken to make good any
deficiency of the fund.  No new approval of the fiscal authority is formally required in
this case either, and it will rarely be good practice for the authorities to try to stall on the
payment of legal liabilities in this regard.  (Only where the government is already in such
a severe fiscal crisis that it is unable to pay other liabilities as they fall due would delays
in meeting insured depositor losses be worth considering). Nevertheless, in practice this
now presents the fiscal authorities with an urgent and likely sizable need for cash.
Going beyond what may have been undertaken as part of an explicit deposit insurance
scheme, the fiscal authorities do begin to have some legal discretion.  The failure of one
or more large banks will certainly raise the question of whether the adverse effect on
confidence and on the functioning of the payments system is sufficient to warrant the
ermergency  extension of government protection to hitherto unprotected depositors.
Decisive action is necessary here.  If cover is to be provided, it should be provided
promptly: a delay is likely to result in heavier losses and in some of the adverse
confidence and disruption effects which the cover is designed to avoid. But there should
be no presumption of cover being provided: moderate banking collapses affecting an
identifiably high-risk segment of the market may not create much contagion.  If so, the
pressures to cover uninsured depositors should be resisted both on grounds of equity and
efficiency.  Equity, inasmuch as foolhardy depositors will be remunerated by hapless
taxpayers; efficiency not only because of the moral hazard effect on future risk-taking of
the signal provided by this policy, but also because of the marginal cost of public funds.5
Making this decision requires some way of making a social evaluation of the risk of
contagion and of disruption.  This in turn must be set against the other demands on public
funds.  That is not to say that action should be deferred when the government cannot
afford to pay-off depositors: the reality must be faced up to promptly, even if the
resolution is ultimately phased over a long interval.
5 Often neglected in public policy discussion, the distorting marginal effect of taxation implies that the
value of the marginal public spending proposal must be greater than $ for $, if the proposal is to justify the
imposition of (present or future) taxation to fund it.
7In short, it may be possible and desirable to limit the extent of emergency cover granted.
With this in mind, it is worth classifying the claims on banks in a number of tiers,
corresponding to the likely priority to be attached to protecting the claim-holders.
Small deposits of residents in local currency;
Other deposits of residents in local currency;
Deposits of residents in foreign currency;
Deposits of non-residents;
Commercial paper and other bonds issued by the bank;
Loan commitments;
Equity.
There will be strong and probably irresistible political pressure to meet the deposits of
low income households.  In practice any distinction here will probably have to be on the
basis of size of deposit rather than wealth of depositor.6 It is worth bearing in mind in
this context that the really poor households in developing countries do not hold bank
accounts at all, and that the prosperous middle classes likely to be lobbying for covet i:n  a
crisis will have an irtflated idea of what a "small" deposit is. As a reference point the
cover offered by the US federal insurance schemes - often considered excessively
generous - is less than four times annual per capita GNP; the schemes recently put in
place in the Europeani  Union typically cover about twice annual per capita GNP.
Mechanically applying these figures in Thailand would give a range of about US$5-
10,000;  in Nigeria  the range would  be US$500-$1,000. 7
Limiting emergency cover to small deposits could reduce the potential liability by a 'rery
substantial amount while still fully covering a large proportion of depositors, becaus,: the
skewed distribution of deposits (many small, few large) means the bulk of the total
deposits of any bank comes from a small number of large deposits.  However, a risk in
practice is that many exemptions from the ceiling on grounds of hardship may be granted,
nullifying much of the savings and discrediting the process.
Foreign currency-denominated deposits present a distinct category.  For one thing,
political pressure to cover these may be much lower in that -apart from the working
balances of trading companies - their holding is widely seen as representing a bet, or at
least a hedge, against the government's exchange rate and general economic policy.  k
government refusal to extend emergency cover to these deposits will often command
political approval.  Funrthermore,  loss of foreign currency deposits by large companie;, or
banks is arguably less likely to disrupt the domestic payments system.  Finally,
assumption of foreign currency liabilities greatly increases the vulnerability of the buidget
6 Though  an attempt  could  be made  to limit  the number  of payouts  to a given household  to deal with  tVLe
problem  of systematic  splitting  of accounts  to increase  protection  ("smurfmg").  This  problem  is more
severe in an explicit deposit insurance scheme than in the case of extending emergency cover discussed
here.
7 As it happens, both of these countries have, or are now introducing explicit deposit insurance schem .s, so
that this discussion of emergency cover does not apply strictly to them.
8to exchange rate change.  Considering that banking and currency crises often go hand-in-
hand, this is an important and practical consideration (cf  Mishkin, 1997).
Foreign (non-resident) holders of bank deposits exert their own form of pressure on the
government to assume the liabilities of failing banks.  General considerations of fairness
and some legal principles might argue in favor of equal treatment of nonresidents and
residents alike, but the risk of disruption of the domestic payments system is much less,
and the authorities may well wish to consider limiting payouts to foreign depositors.
But the foreign depositors can present some threats, and in practice these have been
sufficient to gain them cover not only for deposits, but also for non-deposit claims, an
experience that goes back for a couple of decades at least (Diaz Alejandro, 1983).  In
principle, though, non-deposit liabilities of banks can and should be treated differently to
deposits.
Finally we have equity, which in principle should never be bailed-out.8
4.  Cross-country approaches to early warning in the literature
A growing literature considers how to identify countries at risk of a crisis, and ideally to
predict its timing.  This can be of some assistance to national authorities in that, finding
themselves in an "at risk" category from an international study might alert them to some
hidden problems.
4.1  The skeptics
But this literature cannot be used to provide a reliable predictor of the timing and scale of
fiscal burdens.  Though Portes probably exaggerates when he says that: "The 'early
warning' literature.. .dates back 25 years at least;.. .it is as unsuccessful as ever"9, not too
much can be expected from these systems, especially insofar as they relate to currency
crises. Wyplosz elaborates on the inherent difficulties of forecasting the timing and even
the probability of a currency crisis when the crisis is driven by self-fulfilling market
expectations in circumstances where multiple market equilibria exist:
We could hope to use theory and past experience to identify those
weaknesses that are necessary for attacks to occur and to construct  early
warning indicators accordingly. But since weaknesses are not sufficient
conditions for a crisis, they can only indicate countries that are not
immune to speculative attacks. Neither those countries with a reasonably
high probability of attack actually facing an attach, nor the timing of a
It should go without  saying  that where,  as in Argentina  today,  banks  are required  for prudential  purposes
to issue  subordinated  debt  to institutions  unrelated  to the shareholders  or management  that  these, like  the
shareholders  themselves,  should  not be bailed-out.
9  Comments made at the CEPR/GEI Roundtable on "World Capital Markets and Financial Crises",
Warwick, 24-25 July 1998.
9crisis can be predicted. For self-fulfilling crises, the forecasting properties
of estimated models are likely to be very disappointing.  (Wyplosz, 1998)
Some types of banking crisis (especially those associated with currency crises) are
certainly triggered by this kind of self-fulfilling expectations mechanism which is thus
inherently unforecastible.  But we can still assess some aspects of vulnerability and scale.
Three complementary approaches already in the literature are now briefly reviewed.
4.2  Watching for different varieties of crisis
Honohan (1997) shows that banking crises come in different varieties.  In addition to
those caused by macro-boom and bust (such as those driven by self-fulfilling
expectations), there have also been epidemics of bank insolvency attributable to poor
management and other microeconomic deficiencies, not associated with macroeconomic
collapses.  Furthermore, there have also been many situations where countries faced
endemic crises, displaying a recurrent pattern of distress with insolvency and illiquidity
(usually traceable to pervasive government involvement) persisting for years.  These
types of problem seem more amenable to early warning, as the conditions of insolvency
are slow-evolving, even if the timing of its revelation is exogenous.  If the authorities are
alert to the characteristics of these syndromes, they may be able to intervene early.  There
will be a heightened risk of problems following regulatory and technological changes,
including privatization and financial liberalization (Honohan, 1997), Of course, this is
primarily the role of the banking authorities, but in the case of the endemic problems
driven by excessive gXovernment  intervention, the fiscal authorities may have a direcit  role
in stopping the rot.
When directed credit, arbitrary and onerous taxation and other quasi-tax impositions
press hard on the banking system, the banks cease to be autonomous profit-seeking
institutions and becomne  quasi-fiscal entities, dependent for their strategy and surviva[ on
the instructions and decisions of government.  The underlying solvency of such banks  man
quickly be eroded.  H[ere  is the emergence of a banking crisis in the fiscal authorities' own
back yard, as it were.
Honohan (1997) enwnerates early warning indicators that can be used to identify
countries at risk of problems.  The indicators are different for each type of crisis.
(Although that paper was completed before the East Asian crisis, the indicators listedl for
macro-based crises were already flashing strongly for the subsequently affected
countries.) But this approach does not quantify the likely fiscal costs.  Its purpose is to
signal the need for further detailed examination at the country level.
4.3  Expert ratings and outer limits
A rather different approach has been adopted by Standard and Poors rating agency
(Karacadag and Manzer, 1997). Though not neglecting the role of micro deficiencie!; and
10government interference, their strategy is to quantify the gross banking assets at risk from
a major economic downturn.  They do this by assigning the country a quality rating based
on its vulnerability to asset quality pressure during a recession, and applying a factor
(between zero and one) corresponding to the rating to the total assets of the financial
system to obtain a quantification they call "gross problematic assets".'"  They also assess
separately the risk of a downturn.  Although their methodology is not presented
explicitly, they state that:
Trends in credit growth (to the private sector and public enterprises), corporate
and household indebtedness, asset-price inflation, and external funding of
financial institutions are key indicators of leverage. Rapid increases in two or
more of these indicators denote a growing, and possibly excessive, degree of
economy-wide leverage... .The rankings are expressed in terms of the potential
level of problematic assets that the financial system may accumulate in a
reasonable worst-case economic downturn. They reflect Standard & Poor's
appraisal of factors such as financial sector management and regulation, the pace
of change in the regulatory and operating environment, the degree of
macroeconomic volatility, and the extent of moral hazard and information
deficiencies within the country.
The quantification provided by S&P is presented as a range -quite a wide one in practice.
It does not aim to be a measure of the direct exposure of the fiscal authority, but of the
gross exposure of the economy (as measured by the size of problematic assets), which is
seen as having both direct and indirect effects on the budget.  Referring, as it does, to a
"reasonable worst-case economic downturn" and to the total of problematic assets, it is
clearly pointing to outer limits, and as such is closer to the VAR approach than to an
expected value approach. Assuming that not all problematic assets would convert into
total loss, the percentages of GDP shown by S&P would exceed the fiscal liability by a
large margin even in the "worst case economic downturn".
4.4  Predicting when the crash will come
A third approach is exemplified by Detragiache and Demirguic-Kunt (1998a and b, 1999),
who employ an econometric model (pooled time-series cross section logit) to explain the
incidence of banking crises.  This draws on observable macroeconomic measures
(including GDP growth, change in terms of trade, real interest rate, inflation, growth of
credit, fiscal surplus, reserves cover for the money stock and whether there has been a
recent financial liberalization).  If the model is used to warn of a crisis whenever the
fitted probability of crisis exceeds the population average incidence, the equation is
successful in classifying (within sample) about two in every three country/year points as
either a crisis or not a crisis, and as such provides valuable information about the
contributory factors to and triggers of crises.  Of course, despite being probably the best
10  This is similar  to the concept  of "Potential  Future  Exposure  (PFE)"  used by the Basle Committee  in its
1999  advisory  paper on highly leveraged  funds,  and defined  as "How  far could a contract  move into the
money  over some  defined  horizon  and some  confidence  interval".
11available, such an equation cannot be used in a mechanical way as a forecasting tool,
being subject to a familiar testing drawback: it generates too many false alarms (about six
for every correct alarm during the sample period).  Raising the threshold probability to
exclude some of these false positives results in too many actual crisis events slippinlg
through.  Fully one half of the crises occurred when the fitted probability was .07 or less.
Only in a small number of extreme macroeconomic conditions does the equation generate
high crisis probabilities: all but ten of 36 actual crises have a fitted probability belowv
0.25.
Furthermore, as shown by Detragiache and Demirgiiu-Kunt (1999) this kind of  model,
used out-of-sample., would not have given any clear signal of the East Asian crisis, even
as late as May 1997 the model would not have rung alarm bells for the East Asian
countries, for which "the overall image.. .would have been a rather reassuring one",
assigning, for example, a probability of only 0.033 to a Thai banking crisis.  A major
practical obstacle to the effective use of such models is that they rely heavily on macro-
financial indicators such as interest rates and exchange rates, whose sudden spikes are
hard to forecast; little advance warning can be obtained from just this information. To be
sure, longer-term institutional and policy factors that pre-dispose a country to crisis are
also included as explanatory variables in these and similar studies (e.g. Hardy and
Pazarbasioglu, 1998, Keefer, 1998), but in practice, quantification of such factors is
highly imperfect.
With such low estimated probabilities, the main potential value of this sort of exerc ise is
not so much a matter of spotting the next crisis, as a way of economizing on
precautionary costs.  In other words, although it seems that we cannot hope for a reliable
forecasting system ior banking crises, based on econometric analysis of macro variables,
or more generally on information that is quantified and readily available to the
econometrician, these forecasting models can be used in the context of the decision
whether or not to take costly precautionary action. Even if one is not be able to predict
the timing of the crisis with much confidence, there are still gains to be made by avoiding
unnecessary and costly precautionary action being taken when the probability of
imminent crisis is low.  Depending on the relative costs of entering a crisis without
having taken such precautions (as against taking the precautions unnecessarily) a nt
saving can be made over a period of time using the model's predictions together wil h a
trigger point for actiLon.
4.5  Country characteristic correlates of the size of crisis
A less studied statistical issue is what country characteristics are associated with cos,tly
crises, regardless of when they happen.  Warning that, given the wide margin of error in
available resolution cost estimates, it would be unwise to place too much reliance oii an
examination of cross-country patterns, Honohan (1996) repotted that few of the main
macroeconomic characteristics of countries appear to be correlated with the relative s:ze
of resolution costs.  The only noteworthy correlation revealed by regression analysi;
12suggests that disproportionately higher resolution costs seem to be experienced by
economically smaller countries as measured by GDP.  11,12
Statistical models based on readily available macroeconomic and institutional indicators
can thus be of assistance to the financial regulator as part of the information flow
triggering preventive measures.  Small increases in the estimated probability of crisis can
matter there.  Even if one strongly suspects that unmeasured factors (including the curreint
capitalization and risk profile of the banking system) strongly predispose a particular
country to a crisis, and thus that the fitted equation greatly underestimates the probability
of crisis, an increase in the fitted probability can helpfully signal the imminence of the
crisis. However, it will obviously not do in such circumstances to derive an expected
value of the fiscal liability by simply multiplying the fitted probability of crisis by the
projected size of loss conditional on crisis: neglecting the suspected downward bias of the
equation will result in a large error. 13
5.  Scale and probability
The two most commonly asked question in regard to the fiscal impact of banking crises
is: "How big is the problem?", and "When will it hit us?"  In practice these are questions
on which precision can rarely be expected, even in mature and sophisticated financial
systems. Furthermore, those asking the question are often unclear about what precisely
they mean.  The purpose of this section is to clarify the concepts of scale, risk and timing
that it is proposed to employ in the contingency calculations.  The discussion is
supplemented by a more formal treatment in Appendix 1.
Some situations are more tractable than others. The situation is clear if a bank fails
because of massive fraud, leaving few assets and an easily quantified block of insured
depositors.  The net liability in this case is substantially crystallized, and the uncertainties
of future recovery are small.  In contrast, the situation of a bank which has hit liquidity
problems following a capital outflow in the face of an equity market collapse and a
speculative attack on the exchange rate may be extremely difficult to assess.  The
potential for repayment of its loans is highly contingent on the subsequent
macroeconomic evolution and the fact that the condition of the borrowers is not widely
known inhibits the establishment of a unambiguous market price.  Here there is both a
deficiency of current information and a high degree of volatility of future
developments.14 Because of the different time-scales over which the uncertainty is
"On average,  halving  a country's  size (GDP)  increases  the resolution  cost  as a share of GDP  by one tenth.
This  correlation  is robust  to the inclusion  of other  explanatory  variables. Another  variable  which  seems  to
significantly  reduce the costs  is the rate of import  growth,  possibly  summarizing  one dimension  of
economic  openness.
12 It is probable  that cross-country  regulatory  and institutional  data  now being collected  by DECRG  will
help throw  more  light on this question.
'3 And even if no bias is suspected, expected value is, as mentioned, not the concept we would like to use in
a low probability environment
14 While some of the bank's assets can be marked to market, others have an option value which is likely to
be more valuable to the bank than to any prospective purchaser because of the private information which
13resolved, we need a concept of "scale of the problem" that can accommodate both types
of situation.  Perhaps the most useful and unambiguous concept of "scale of the problem"
is obtained if we think of the fiscal authority as having sold a put option to the banking
system.  If the banks get into trouble, they will exercise this option by failing -and
thereby triggering a fiscal outlay.
This option value concept of the scale of the problem accommodates both the remote
contingencies that need to be borne in mind even in a healthy system, and the certain
payments that will have to provided for where a bank has closed and the depositors have
been promised payrnent.  In the first case, where the eventual outlays are heavily
contingent on the evolving situation, the option value takes account of the range of
probabilities involved.  The option is "out of the money" and its value essentially arises
from future risks.  In the other case, the situation has crystallized, even though the
amounts involved may not yet be known.  The option is then "in the money" and its value
is dominated by a loss that has already crystallized.
To adopt the option value concept is not necessarily to use valuation formulas based on
known stochastic processes. That could be appropriate if the risks involved were chiefly
driven by movements in observable market prices, but this is not so.  Instead, we will
simplify the question by assuming that the fiscal authority is conducting an assessment of
the situation at a particular moment when some matters have crystallized, but when the
impact of specific future or recent shocks has yet to be felt.  Thus there is a "present" -
represented (albeit irnperfectly) by the accounts of the banks - and an "immediate future"
- in which specific shocks may worsen the situation.  For such circumstances, traditional
expected value calculations will provide an adequate approximation unless the risk of
crisis is low.
To take account of the longer-term risks that face even a healthy banking system, we
could add an additional component, not based on the current condition of the bankinl 1
system, but at most on the broad institutional and environmental conditions of the
country.  As mentioned in 4.5 above, there is little firm basis for making such
distinctions.  Instead.,  a common allowance for the long-run expected fiscal liability frclm
a currently healthy banking system can simply be added to the estimate derived froir  the
assessment of the short-run exposure.
6.  An accounting approach to bank losses
If we are to quantify potential fiscal costs arising from the losses incurred by banks, eve
need to consider how these losses arise.'5 From an accounting point of view, it is us;ffil
to distinguish between three sources of losses to banks.  First, and quantitatively the inost
the bank holds.  Although  it would  be convenient  if these  two sources  of uncertainty  could  be kept di!;tLict,
they will  both enter into a market  valuation  of the bank's  net worth,  and will also influence  the net pr.  sent
value  of the government's  liability.
1  This  is not intended  as a comprehensive  list  of possible  risk  factors.
14important factor in most recent cases in developing countries is losses in the loan
portfolio due to inability or unwillingness of the borrowers to repay.  A second factor is
losses in the portfolio of market-related investments, including foreign exchange and
derivatives.  Third is fraud by insiders which may manifest itself in various parts of the
balance sheet.  We consider these in reverse order.
Fraud.  Poorly run and lightly capitalized banks are the most vulnerable to fraud, and
such banks will often be the subject of suspicion and rumors in the market.  But such
warning signs are not always clear and present and fraud will otherwise arise as a
stochastic and unpredictable occurrence. Fortunately, fraud is usually not on a scale that
will generate a systemic crisis; the cases of Guinea on 1984 (Tenconi, 1992) being one of
the exceptions. BCCI was a large multinational case, though it did not present systemic
problems.  Correct accounting will eventually uncover fraud, and when it is uncovered,
the magnitude of losses will soon become evident.  Even if the perpetrator is
apprehended, it is likely that little can be recovered.  This third source is thus one which
is hard to scale in advance, but relatively easy when it has been discovered.
Market risk.  Market-related investments can in principle be priced to market (though this
is not always done in conventional bank accounts).  In principle, then, a static estimate of
this source of loss should be available to the regulatory authorities in the normal course.
Once again, management errors may confuse matters temporarily (as in the Barings Bank
case) but in the case of market-risk, it is the dynamic picture rather than the static that
needs particular attention.  A market portfolio can have positive present value, but at the
same time involve a very large risk of substantial future losses if market prices move
against the portfolio.  If one or two banks have taken a big bet of this type, that need not
translate into serious fiscal pressures: provided supervision remains current, such banks
can be intervened before their capital is totally lost, and their good business will allow
them to be recapitalized by new owners. More likely to cause problems are system-wide
bets, especially on foreign exchange and on interest rates.  Foreign exchange bets are
usually proscribed by regulation limiting net open positions, but banks may circumvent
such regulations if the interest differentials are sufficiently tempting (as happened before
the Mexican crisis of 1994). The quality of an apparent hedge may be suspect, as when
wholesale funding in foreign exchange from non-resident banks is matched by foreign
currency lending to domestic non-banks without foreign currency receivables.  In that
case an exchange risk has merely been transformed into a credit risk, as such borrowers
may be wholly unable to meet their obligations at a much higher exchange rate.
System-wide interest rate risk resulting from maturity mismatch is less common
nowadays, though it was the original source of the collapse of the US Savings and Loan
industry, and also led to de facto  insolvencies in housing credit institutions in Transition
economies.
There is a huge literature on measuring market risk of a portfolio, based on statistical and
decision theory, including proprietary packages such as J.P. Morgan's Riskmetrics.  The
most popular of the summary measures of risk now employed is "value at risk" which is
essentially a given ordinate (usually the 9 9th)  of the probability density. Some of these
15techniques and measures have been extended into loan portfolio analysis (cf. J.P.
Morgan's Creditmetrics), but it seems unlikely that the underlying statistical regularities
are sufficiently well-known or stable for this to be widely applicable in practice yet in
developing countries.
Loan losses. Projecting loan losses in a volatile economic environment is a most
uncertain business.  The private information accumulated by each bank on the
creditworthiness of its clients is a major source of the bank's profit.  Outsiders should not
easily be able to second-guess the bank's management on the recoverability of a loan.
(But, because of the tendency for bank management to understate their loan-losses,
outsiders may be able to improve on the management's stated estimates as represented in
the loan-loss reserves actually provided for in the accounts.)  The usual procedure that is
recommended is to classify loans into about five qualitative categories, varying from a
loan deemed lost and to be fully written-off up to a fully satisfactory loan.  In some
countries, there has been an accumulation of experience over many years allowing
bankers, auditors and supervisors to reach a fairly ready agreement on how each loan
should be categorized.  Regulation based on historical experience dictates what loan-loss
provisions should be mnade  for each category of loan.  (In addition a general provision
against loan losses of between 1 and 2 per cent of outstanding loan balances is also made
in the balance sheet).  In normal times in the United States, these provisioning rules
provide a reliable indicator of recoverable loans, as can be verified from liquidation
records of the many banks that are dissolved or otherwise intervened in that country.  In a
recession, and afortiori  in other countries with a shorter track record, with greater
economic volatility and with a less diversified economic base, the reliability of loan
classification and loss provisioning procedures is much lower.
Loan loss provisioning is more likely to be accurate for diversified portfolios and where
loan risks are idiosyncratic rather than systematic.  A property market bust, an exchange
rate collapse or the collapse of an important export crop price, or a natural disaster of
nation-wide proportions are examples of systemic risks that are poorly captured in
standard loan classification and loan provisioning procedures.  Note that these are the
circumstances under which collaterals are more likely to have also lost their value wher l
the loan cannot be repaid.  In summary, even the best implementation of loan
classification is unlikely to be informative about the scale of losses impacting the budg;et
in the event of a bad macro shock.
Other risks that may be serious for individual banks, or for the conduct of monetary anc
exchange rate policy include liquidity risk, where banks are funding illiquid domestic
loans with demand or short-notice wholesale funds on the international capital market.
Sudden withdrawals of finds may leave the bank unable to meet its obligations as they
fall due, but in principle:  this is a matter which should be resolvable by liquidity loans
from the central bank.  16
16 Needless  to say, such liquidity  lending  does  expose  the central  bank to substantial  risks  in that the
decision  usually  has  to be taken  at very  short  notice and  without  the benefit  of an up-to-date  and reliable
assessment  of whether  the beank  truly  is solvent  but illiquid. Also, if the withdrawals  are due to loss of
confidence  in the currency,  tCien  a liquidity  loan will come  straight  out of the foreign  exchange  reserves.
16Overdues as an early warning signal.  The most commonly used early warning indicator
of loan losses, namely overdues, is also of limited value.  Although servicing payments
on a loan may become overdue for many and varied reasons, overdue payments on a loan
certainly heightens the probability of less than full recovery.  That is why accounting
procedures typically require special provisions to be made against loans that are overdue
beyond a certain delay (often 90 days or 180 days), and the provisions should be made
against the full value of the loan and not just against the installment or interest payments
that are actually in arrears.
Not all overdue loans will be wholly lost; even if the borrower does not perform, there
may be some collateral value (though less in times of crisis).  But loans that  are not in
arrears can also be problematic.  For one thing, poorly managed banks will often, in what
is sometimes called evergreening, grant a loan extension or a rollover of interest due in
such a way as to conceal overdue payments.  But even without evergreening,  troubled
borrowers may still keep their bank interest payments current until close to the end.  At
all events, statistics on loan overdues peak long after the crisis is well advanced.  Note
that it is not correct to state that loan overdues are a lagging indicator of the crisis, as an
upturn in loan losses in often observed before the crisis hits; but the pre-crisis increase is
typically dwarfed by the post-crisis increase.
Loan losses and capital deficiency. It is worth clarifying a few further simple points
about the relationship between bank accounts and the potential fiscal liability.  Banks are
required to maintain a minimum level of capital in relation to their total risk assets. This
capital appears in the balance sheet as a liability - owed in effect to shareholders or other
subordinated claim holders.  The shareholders' funds or net worth are the residual item: a
decline in the true recoverable value of the bank's assets is, in the first instance,
effectively absorbed by this element of capital.  If this capital falls below the regulated
amount, it has to be topped-up for the bank to remain in operation.  But (assuming the
accounts to be otherwise accurate) it should be possible to find shareholders willing to
put up the additional capital as long as the net worth of the bank remains positive (or
even beyond that point, considering that the bank's business embodies a franchise value
that will generate future profits whose value is not recognized in the balance sheet.
Arranging for such an injection of funds may not be easy; especially at times of crisis.
And there may be a role for government to assist in this matter, but the essential point
remains that sizable losses to the banking system can occur without the government
having to step in to bail-out the depositors.  The figures for overall loan-losses of the
banking system will overstate the potential fiscal liability by at least the size of the banks'
true initial capital.
7.  The proposed framework
Even auditors and practitioners with access to detailed bank-level information often
refuse to make a quantitative forecast of the potential fiscal cost even when the crisis has
struck.  But this is what we must try to do.  It might appear that a reliable balance sheet
17would inform us of the capital deficiency of the banking system, but this is rarely the case
in a crisis, not only because the underlying data may be unreliable, but especially because
the adequacy and accuracy of the provisions made in the banks' accounts for loan losses
cannot be assured. Even confining oneself to a static picture, an accurate estimate of the
gross deficiency of the banking system may require second-guessing the bank's
accountants.  But in addition, account has to be taken of the vulnerability to future or
recent shocks not taken account of in the accounts.
To formalize the question, let us suppose that there are only two relevant time points:
now and the future.  The bank has certain earning assets - market related investments and
non-marketable advances; these have been financed by deposits, and by shareholders'
capital.  The future value of the earning assets is uncertain.  But in the future period,
uncertainty will be resolved and the residual net value of shareholders' capital will
become known.  From the fiscal authorities' viewpoint, the important question is what is
the probability of the neHt  capital value being negative, and what is the possible size of
such a deficiency.
Different classifications of the bank's balance sheet17  will be relevant for different shocks.
One general-purpose classification is as follows: represent the bank's balance sheet in
simplified form as: A+B=C+D where A is advances, B is market-related investments
(bills), C is capital and D deposits.  At present, A and B are uncertain; D may be taken as
known, and C is a residual and hence unknown.  We postulate a measurement error u and
a vector of future disturbances v affecting asset value. 18 With these definitions, let us
write the future value oi capital as the following function:
C=A+B-D
We can use the same identity defining capital C, focussing on alternative elements A and
B of the balance sheet as the most significant for whatever scenario is at hand, leaving tlhe
remaining net items, little affected by the shocks under consideration, to be included as
the residual D.
We now recognize the contribution of future shocks to the value of A, B and D.
A = AO  +a 2'v
B=Bo +±3 2 'V,
D = Do  +82 'V
and the distinct contribution of current measurement error with regard to the basic value
which would emerge in the absence of any disturbances.
17 Not forgetting  that off-balance  sheet  items  can also carry  risk.
18 In the algebraic  treatment  thlat  follows,  we take the disturbances  to be additive  rather  than proportionate
This is essentially  for convenience  of notation:  because  the balance  sheet  is built up from additive
components,  proportionate  disturbances  cannot  be explicitly  incorporated  without  considerable  notational
complexity.  In practice it may often be more realistic to build in proportionality by making the parametei s
a, 8, d proportionate to the balance sheet elements.
18S 0 = a0 + a1u
Bo = fl0 + Ahu
Do = 50 + 5,u
Assuming that the residual D (deposits) is measured without significant error and that
their future value is not much affected by economic shocks, we can write:  8S  =  '2  = 0.
The non-stochastic part of capital yo = ao +,80 - S. can be taken as representing a
similar concept to that of the accounting value of the bank's capital.
If the stochastic terms u and v are independently distributed with probability density 0
and  r, respectively, then the expected value of bank capital is:
E(C)  = f  J  C(u, v)((u)V(v)dudv  =rO  + yf  uo(u)du Y2f  v yI(v)dv
Note that this is not the same as the market value of the bank's shares.  That equivalence
would only hold if (i) the full information set were available to the market, (ii) market
investors were risk neutral and (iii) there were no limited liability, and that shareholders
would cover any occurrence of negative capital.  The third point here is of course the
source of the potential fiscal liability.  Thus we may write as an estimate of the value of
the potential fiscal liability E(F), minus the expected value of the bank's capital
conditional on it being negative:
E(F)=-  fC(u,v)b(u)WV(v)dudv
cO
(This cannot be expressed as the sum of independent integrals in u and v respectively.)19
Finally, the potential liability from each bank needs to be summed to obtain the total
potential liability from the system as a whole.
This formulation can be adapted to many different environments.  In particular the type
of shock being assessed will typically dictate a particular classification of the portfolio in
order to isolate that part which is particularly sensitive to the type of shock at hand.
Sometimes we will be sure of the size of shock, so that it is not necessary to take
expectations.  In any event, the formulation highlights four elements that need to be
quantified:
Deficiencies in accounting estimates of the current (i.e. pre-shock) condition of
the banking system;
The size of different elements in the banks' portfolios;
The size and probability of likely shocks;
The proportionate impact of any given shock on the value of key elements of the
banking system's portfolio.
'9 If conditions (i) and (ii) prevailed, then the market value V of the shares would equal the sum of the
expected value of bank capital and of the potential fiscal liability as defined:  V = E(C) + E(F).  This
relationship could potentially be of use in approximating the fiscal liability.
19Accounting deficiencies
The task of spotting instances of fraud, and of ensuring that the portfolio of market-
related investments are marked-to-market, where appropriate,20  are essentially matters for
the bank regulator, as is ensuring that the banks have made adequate provision against
loan losses.  Second-guessing the assessment of the bank regulators of the adequacy of
the banking system's accounts is not really something that can usually be recommended
for the fiscal authority.  What the fiscal authority needs to do is to ensure that it is
adequately informed about the degree to which regulatory assessments of bank capital
deviates from published data.
But there is an important additional point to be made here.  It has often happened that
fiscal rules - and specifically the degree to which loan-loss provisions are allowable a,
tax deductions - have been a strong influence in the direction of poor accounting and
inadequate provisioning against loan-losses.  In many countries there is a restrictive
ceiling on the amount of provisions that can be set against tax. 21 Bank accountants (and
often their auditors too) tend to regard this tax rule as an accounting rule, and fail to make
provisions against future loan-losses that are already predictable.  By exaggerating in this
way the apparent profits of banks with a view to enhancing tax revenue, the fiscal
authorities may be misleading themselves as to the potential future burden on the public
finances coming from the banking system.  If this leads to confusion and a delay in
needed intervention, the ultimate fiscal cost could be much higher than needed; the
apparent gain in tax re venues may be far exceeded by the later bail-out costs.
Size and composition of the portfolio
Subject to the question of accounting deficiencies, it is a relatively simple matter to
assemble data on the e]ements of the balance sheet.  Much of the information is public y
available on an annual or quarterly basis.  Less readily available may be such sub-
aggregates as that part of the portfolio that is denominated in foreign exchange, or that
part of the loan portfoli o that is advanced for property development.  Perhaps the most
important caveat is thal:  system-wide averages are totally inadequate.  The incidence o0i
bank failure is never urniform  across the system, and the authorities may have to pay fo.
costly failures even in a system which, as a whole, is solvent.
Size of likely shocks
Although there is a large variety of potential shocks that we can imagine impacting the
banking system, three particular types crop up with such regularity that they are worth
special attention.  These are: exchange rate changes, property (real estate) price collaps -s
and macroeconomic recessions.  Evidently these need not be independent occurrences,
but they have rather distinct patterns of impact on the portfolio of the banking system.  At
20 There  is some  debate  as to whether  longer-term  investments  which  the bank intends  to hold  to maturit,
need to be marked-to-market,  and  what reserves  should  be made  for valuation  changes.
21 Escolano  (1997)  discusses  the different  types of fiscal  rule that are commonly  applied.
20the time of a fiscal contingency calculation, it is typical that one or more of these shocks
is considered particularly likely, or is in progress. That will provide some guidance as to
what type and range of shocks should be taken into account.
The multiplier
For marketed securities, historical price and return correlations can allow some estimates
of the likely portfolio impact of certain shocks, though this is less true for the emerging
markets where historical experience is short and volatile.  Furthermore, it may be unwise
to rely too heavily on historical correlations where we can have little confidence in the
time-invariance of the processes involved. For loan portfolios there has, unfortunately,
been very little work done that would allow us to quantify the impact of a shock of a
given type and size on the value of elements of banks' loan portfolios.
Box:  Quantifying the multipliers
What would we need, if we were to make an econometric estimate of the
multiplier effect of a given exogenous shock on the value of a loan
portfolio?  First, we would need to identify and measure the shocks, and
ensure that they are exogenous (a problematic point where banking crises
tend to feedback onto exchange rate and property prices, as well as onto
subsequent economic growth).  Second, we would need to have reliable
estimates of required loan loss provisions before and after the shock (also
problematic, since the need to assess the quality of loan-loss provisioning
has often been triggered historically by the crisis itself; therefore "before"
estimates are usually not available). Third, we would have to consider
whether the multipliers will be invariant across countries (doubtful,
because of international differences in economic structures and breakdown
of the banking portfolio).
Depending, then, on the type of shock that is anticipated, or in progress, or on the
suspected source of accounting deficiencies, we have a broad framework that can be
adapted to the particular circumstances by appropriate re-classification of the banks'
balance sheet and application of the multiplier and probabilistic approach outlined above.
Possible classifications into A and B for a selection of scenarios is shown below.  The
purpose of the classification is to allow separate treatment of the two main elements
affected by the type of shock shown (C is always capital, and D the net residual).
Action plan
To summarize, what we are proposing involves four key steps.
Specijy the shocks
We assume that the analyst's concerns arise from certain imminent or recent
economic shocks. These shocks need to be explicitly specified and quantified so
21far as is possible (exchange rate, property market, terms of trade, general
economic downturn, etc,)
Split the balance sheet
Obtain balance sheet information for the main banks, and reclassify into
categories differentially affected by the shocks as exemplified in the table of tl e
previous section.  Take care to carry out this analysis on a bank-by-bank basis.;
aggregates wil].  not do.
Apply multipliers
Based on the assumed shock, apply plausible multipliers to the chosen balance
sheet categories.  Calculate capital deficiencies for each bank and sum.
Adjust accounting
If considered necessary (and it usually will be) make adjustments for problematic
accounting (as discussed - logically this comes before splitting the balance sheet,
as it may require a different split)
This procedure gives a maximum fiscal liability, as it implicitly assumes that the bank
will be made whole by the fiscal authority.  Recalculating to allow for loss absorption by
other claimants is a straightforward exercise.
A  B
Exchange rate shocks  FX-denominated loans  Other FX-denominated
(affected both directly by  assets (net)
currency  translation  and  (affected  mainly  by currency
indirectly  by changed  loan-loss  translation)
experience)
Property market shocks  Loans to real estate  Other loans secured on rt al
developers  estate
(net worth  of borrowers  directly  (value  of collateral  decline,)
affected)  .__
General economic shocks  Loan portfolio  Marketable investment',
(net worth  of borrowers  directly  (market  values  affected)
.___________________________  affected)
Problematic accounting;  Government-related loans  Other loans
(unrecognized  collection  (evergreening;  over-optimist:  c
______  __  problems due political influence)  collateral valuation etc.)
228.  A numerical illustration
To illustrate how the framework of the previous section can be applied in practice, we
sketch and application to an exchange rate shock, using data which have been
constructed to fit some typical features of recent country experience (the numbers used
are based on publicly available data for an actual recent case though with some
modifications).
As with many other countries, the country on whose experience we draw saw a sudden
end to a period of several years virtual exchange rate stability. The prospect of a sharp
fall in the currency naturally raised the question of the impact on the banking system, not
least because the banking system was heavily dollarized, with some two-thirds of the
loans denominated in US dollars, and an even higher proportion of deposit liabilities.
Some observers felt  that a contingency provision should be incorporated in the 1999
budget in case of a need to meet banking insolvency.  While the collapse of effective
demand from important export markets was an additional negative factor affecting the
local economy and banking system, the possible impact of the exchange rate can be
separately analyzed.
The system has 44 banks; although we have modelled only the largest 20, we will see that
it is crucial not to aggregate the data too much.
Ignoring, for this example, the issue of possible accounting deficiencies, we proceed
directly to identifying the elements of the banks' portfolios most likely to be affected by
exchange rate change.  The foreign currency business must be identified, and within this
the FX-denominated loans, as these will be subject to heightened loan-loss experience in
the event of a large devaluation. 22 Thus, in the balance sheet identity discussed above
defining capital,
C =A+B-D
we re-interpret A as FX-denominated loans; B as net other FX-denominated assets, and D
as the net remainder of the balance sheet. The disturbance v is the percentage exchange
rate movement, which affects the three elements of the right-hand-side in quite different
ways.  As a reasonable first approximation, we may take the multiplier a3 as zero - no
effect on the local-currency denominated part of the portfolio; the multiplier a2 then
represents the valuation change a2 = B; and the multiplier a, (applied to the FX-
denominated loans) representing the combined impact of valuation change and
heightened loan-loss experience might be modelled as:
a, = (I  -p)A.
This particular specification of a, implies that the increased loan-loss experience is
proportional to the exchange rate shock.  That is a restriction which can be relaxed,
allowing the loan-loss experience to be either more or less sensitive to the exchange-rate
shock:
a, = (I -p(v)) A
22 Published  data does  not separately  identify  FX-denominated  business  in the country  in question,  but we
do have  system-wide  averages,  which  have  been applied  to each bank in this numerical  example
23All that is now required to implement the model is a numerical value for p, and a set of
probabilities for the possible exchange rate changes.
By inputting the systemwide totals for A, B and D, we obtain (Table 1) the estimated net
deficiency of total bank capital C (below a regulatory target of 8% of total assets) for
different values of v and p(v):
Table 1: Estimated gap between net system capital and 8% target
L million  v  0%  14.3%  25%  40%  50%
0.1  0  0  0  O  0
0.2  0  0  0  0  0
0.3  0  0  0  0  0
p(v)=  0.4  0  0  0  0i  0
0.5  0  0  0  4.1  16.6
0.6  0  0  6.7  23.6  40.4
0.7  1.8  12.2  22.6  43.4  64.2
Note: v is percentage  depreciation;  p(v) is percentage  loan-losses.
Table 1 suggests that no overall deficiency will emerge if loan-losses remain below 40%,
and that even worse loan-losses will not result in an overall deficiency unless the
exchange  rate movement is greater than 33%.  But some banks will do better than others,
and the systemwide totals are an inappropriate basis for this calculation.  Table 2 shows
the result when the same calculation is made bank-by-bank, and the results summed.
(See also figure 1). Evidently some capital deficiency will emerge even  with loan-losses
as low as 30 per cent, or even lower if the exchange rate change is sufficiently large.
Table 2: Aggregate value of bank capital deficiencies below regulatory target
L million  v - 0%  14.3%  25%  40%  50%
0.1  0  0  0  0O  0
0.2  0  0  0  0.5  1.4
0.3  0.7  0.9  1.7  3.8.  6.3
p(v)=  0.4  3.0  4.2  5.7  9.7.  16.4
0.5  7.7  9.8  12.8  22.2.  32.2
0.6  15.5  19.6  25.4  37.4  49.6
0.7  24.1  31.3  39.0  54.5  70.3
Note: v is percentage  depreciation;  p(v) is percentage  loan-losses.
24Figure 1: Aggregate value of bank capital deficiencies below regulatory target
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As discussed above, capital deficiency below regulatory target does not trigger a need for
fiscal injection.  In order to approximate the maximum potential fiscal liability, we
compute the aggregate value of negative capitals, summed from bank-by-bank
calculations (Table 3):
Table 3:  Potentialfiscal  liability
L million  v  0%  14.3%  25%  40%  50%
0.1  0  0  0  01  0
0.2  0  0  0  0  0
0.3  0  0  0  0'  1.0
p(v)  0.4  0  0  0.6  2.4,  5.8
0.5  0.5  1.2  2.7  6.9;  14.7
0.6  2.6  4.5  7.5  16.1  26.9
0.7  6.6  10.2  14.7  28.9  43.2
Note: v is percentage depreciation; p(v) is percentage loan-losses.
The table shows that the potential fiscal liability remains modest  (below L7 million or
US$3 million) unless exchange rate change is greater than 40% or loan-losses greater
than 50%.
Combining this information into one expected potential fiscal liability E(F) requires
assigning probabilities to the exchange rate changes and choosing a specific mapping
p(v).  The spreadsheet on which the above tables are based then reveals the value of E(F).
Thus for the probabilities and loan-loss mapping given in Table 4, the expected potential
fiscal liability is just L 2.1 million - or about US$ 1 million.
25Table 4:  Probabilities and loan-loss mapping
v =  0%  14.3%  25%  40%  50%
Prob (v)  0.1  0.2  0.35  0.25  0.1
p(v)  0.1  0.2  0.3  0.4  0.5
Note:  v is  percentage  depreciation;  p(v)  is percentage  loan-losses.
The crucial quantitative assumptions are those of Table 4.  So far, we have not offered
any formal methodology for filling this table.  The assessment here must, for the present,
be based on subjective judgment.  Nevertheless, the methodology allows this judgmelnt to
be combined in a systematic way with the quantitative information that is available.
9.  Spreading the cost over time
It is one thing to have an overall figure that must be covered by the taxpayer sooner c:
later.  But the budgeta;ry  implications will typically extend over a period of years both in
terms of cash outlays, and in terms of accounting. There is a temptation for budgetary
managers to try to arrange for a lengthy deferral of cash outlays, or of the accounting for
such outlays, or both.  Such action is not innocuous.  Excessive backloading of the cash
flow in restructuring arrangements may damage the incentives of private banks.
Likewise the accounting deferral or concealment of public liabilities can lead to policy
errors.
Cash flow.  There is generally no need to meet the full capital deficiency of a bank being
restructured with cash.  The various accepted approaches to restructuring all involve one
of two different mechamisms:  (i) some of the liabilities of the bank are assumed by a
public agency (for example a deposit protection agency);  (ii) non-performaing  assets  rIe
replaced in the bank's portfolio by a government obligation.
If it is a government agency assuming the liabilities, then the agency must be in a
position to meet cash calls.  If it does not itself have cash or liquid reserves, this may t:  e
done through its own borrowing, but if it has no statutory authority to borrow, or if it
cannot call on a government guarantee, the cost and difficulty of making this borrowirig
may well induce the agency to seek an alternative approach which could prove more
expensive in the long run.  There are clear examples from the USA, and from Argentiir  a
in recent times.  These have involved the agency engineering tax-advantaged
arrangements which have either passed the cost to the revenue authorities (USA), or
substituting assumption of implicit future commitments for explicit borrowing
(Argentina), in each case increasing the net fiscal cost in the process.
One official agency which always has the wherewithal to cover domestic currency
obligations arising out of a bank failure is the Central Bank.  While the central bank is
traditionally described as the "lender of last resort", it is only last in line after private
market participants.  In practice it is often the first public agency to which a failing bark
26will have resort.  Central banking theory makes a sharp distinction should be made
between liquidity loans and solvency support. The former are made to a bank under cash
pressure, but which will ultimately be able to liquidate its portfolio.  The latter, to an
insolvent institution, should not be made by the monetary authority, as this will fuel
inflation.  As mentioned in section 2 above, the "inflation tax" has often been used to
help pay for banking collapses. Any country choosing this route should recognize what it
is doing, and not see the use of central bank funds as an easy option.
If there is a fixed exchange rate regime in effect, or when the failing bank has significant
foreign exchange obligations, the central bank may no longer be able to assume the
claims of depositors and still hold to the exchange rate peg.  This is seen in graphic form
in a currency board arrangement, where the statutory constraints on the currency board's
authority to make loans reflects the absolute priority given to the exchange rate peg.
More generally, the market may call into question the government's ability and
willingness to meet out of additional tax revenues, or expenditure cutbacks, the liabilities
that it has suddenly assumed (Brock, 1996). The fall-back position of government may
be to allow inflation and currency depreciation. 23 Or it may slip into arrears and default.
A credible financing plan must be in place to guard against self-fulfilling market
expectations driving the economy into a bad equilibrium here.
Credibility is also the key requirement for any financial instruments used to replace bad
debts in the balance sheet of insolvent banks.  There is always a temptation for
governments to opt for an instrument with low cash outlays. For example, a government
might simply offer the bank a non-interest-bearing bond with a long maturity.  The real
value of such a bond falls well short of value of performing loans of equal nominal value.
A bank that is offered no more than that in return for ceding non-performing loans is
likely to run into difficulties again, as its operations cannot easily be brought back to
profitability.  Even if sufficient zero-coupon bonds are injected to bring the net present
value of the promised payments up to the required level (if calculated at the risk-free
discount rate), such an arrangement can not be regarded as satisfactory.  A government
that acts like that will be suspected of temporizing.  It likely has no clear idea of how it is
going to fund the bullet payment at maturity; holders will discount the value of the bond,
attaching only a moderate probability to its being honored in full and on time.  Marked-
to-market, a bank holding such an asset may still be insolvent, and may feel itself to be
insolvent, with all of the incentive problems that creates.  If the bond is tradable in a
fairly competitive market, these valuation and credibility problems will come out in the
open and force the government to face up to them.
From the banking policy point of view, the financial instruments injected by the
government into the failed bank should be tradable in a liquid market (if there is such a
market).  Ideally, they would bear adjustable interest rates linked to money market rates,
thereby avoiding the introduction of unwarranted interest rate risk.  These considerations
are less important where wholesale financial markets are sufficiently developed to allow
23 This is the basis for the model of Burnside et al. (1998).
27the maturity and interest risk characteristics of the banks' investment portfolio to be
altered through market transactions, but this will not always be the case.
Two other aspects of the financial arrangements following a bank failure are worth
mentioning in this context.  First, the non-performing loans which are carved out of a
failing bank are not worthless.  With good institutional design and contracting for non-
performing asset management and recovery, the government can hope to recover a
portion of its initial outlay - perhaps a very high proportion as was achieved in SweCen
(Drees and Pazarbasioglu, 1998). But absent these conditions, asset recovery agenci ,s
may prove to be no more than an additional drain on the budget.  Second, in a major
crisis, the fiscal authorities may be called upon to inject funds not only to bring the
capital of the banking system back up to zero, but also to provide some of the required
capital for future operation if the system is not to suffer from a credit crunch resulting
from capital starvation.  After all, likely investors in banking will be extremely cautious
in the recessionary post-crisis environment. Here again the authorities can hope to make
a good return on their investment, the design of which should be arranged (through
redemption clauses) to put pressure on the private owners to find enough capital to buy
out the government within a relatively short number of years.
10.  Concluding remarks
Little precision can be hoped for in this area, yet there is a constant demand for an
estimate of the likely fiscal costs of future banking crises.  This paper shows how
information that is typically available to the authorities could be used to obtain an
indication of the order of magnitude of the direct fiscal liability.  The information
required is on the size and composition of the balance sheet of the banks, and on expc  rt
assessments of (i) the accuracy of this accounting data and (ii) specific known short-t,-rm
risks to which the comaponents  are subject. The method distinguishes between short-t frm
and long-term risks, and between the measurement problems of already crystallized
losses, and the changing risks for the immediate future.
It is acknowledged that inclusion by the authorities of an explicit or implicit contingeiicy
for banking collapse in their fiscal calculations might in itself risk worsening the mornl
hazard in the system, or destabilizing expectations.  But the risks of not making
contingency planning generally outweigh the risks of sending confused signals.  And
insisting on ignorance would be a very poor way of protecting against making
announcement errors that trigger panic.
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30Appendix 1: The components of risk and the evolution of a crisis
This appendix examines in greater detail the issues raised in Section 5 of the text.  In
attempting to formalize the fiscal liability arising from a banking crisis, we need to be
clear about the time-scale over which uncertainty is resolved.
As is often remarked, in principle, bank failure is a regulatory decision.  By this is meant
that, in a perfect world, continuous monitoring of the condition of each bank by the
regulator and prompt intervention when the value of capital falls below the regulatory
minimum will eliminate instances of bank insolvency and hence will also ensure that
there are no depositor panics or other sources of extreme illiquidity.  In such a perfect
world, the question of fiscal liability would not arise.
In practice, things work out less smoothly for two main reasons: first, measurement
deficiencies: the true capital of the bank is imperfectly measured; second, regulatory lag:
adverse shocks can cause a deterioration in the capital of the bank more quickly than the
regulator can or will respond.
Crystallization and signals of changing risk
Some of this is captured in the two-period model of Dewatripont and Tirole (D-T, 1994).
In their notation, the bank has deposit liabilities D and a portfolio of loans with starting
value i7o  +  guo.  In the first period some of the bank's loans mature with total value ,u.
There is also a signal v received at time 1 about the likely range of value of the remainder
of the loans, which are not due to mature until the next time period.  This could be a
signal about macro-economic conditions, or about the conduct and performance of the
bank management and the risk-profile of its portfolio.  At time 2, the remainder of the
loans mature, with realized value il.  The interesting date here is time 1: at this date we
can hope to have some infornation  about the portfolio, both in terms of realization to
date (,)  and prospects for next period (v). They assume that ,u is known; and that
knowledge of v gives a probability density for  j  : h(1 I  v). For example, the expected
value of ij, given v, is i(v), which in general will differ from the base period value (before
v is observed)  o*  .
D-T use this framework to recommend rules for when to intervene a bank, based on the
known values of,u and v.  They point out that conventional capital adequacy rules could




whereas using the information v would give a more accurate picture of capitalization:
y()=71(V)  +  A - D
71(v)
For our purpose, the D-T model highlights the sequence of events; the fact that some
risks are crystallized before others, and that accurate accounting information about these
concrete elements (,)  can give us firm information about the solvency of the bank
without looking to future uncertainties.  In addition, however, we may obtain a signal (v)
31which causes us to alter our beliefs about the future recoveries on the loan portfolio, both
in terms of expected value, and overall risk distribution.
Thus, in this two-period framework, we may picture ourselves at date 1, trying to find out
the values of actual outturns p and assess the signals v concerning the likely future value
of items that have not yet crystallized. Due to deliberate or inadvertent measurement
error, the bank may report, in lieu of the true ,u, a biased value p* =,u + u.  Furthermore,
while v may be observed accurately, we may not know the probabilistic mapping q(v).
The practical task of inferring the scale of fiscal liabilities is thus twofold: gauging the
scope for error u in the measurement of what is crystallized, and estimating the
paramneters  of  (v).  Then the fiscal liability may be approximated by minus the sum of
net capital of all banks for which this is negative:
,imax{O,D,  - Pi + 7}7
In section 7 and 8 of ihe text, we show how these two tasks can be operationalized.
Timing
In practice, the world does not end after two periods.  Week-by-week and month-by-
month, some of the bank's ventures are crystallizing, while the prospects for others are
changing.  At any mo.ment  there is still a part of the portfolio whose value can be
regarded as crystallized, while another part is still at risk, with signals constantly being
received about its prospects.  Finally, the bank is constantly entering into new ventures.
The net capital of the bank is thus a stochastic process evolving over a multi-period
horizon.
In the circumstances wve  have described, the timing of a bank's failure, and afortiori  (If a
widespread financial crisis, may or may not be a regulatory decision, but may arise ei-ther
because the size of u is underestimated by the regulators, who thus leave a bank in
operation when it needs intervention, or because a large negative shock occurs, drivinj;
the actual realized value of ywell below its expected value y(v), before the regulators c.m
or do intervene.  For the purpose of calculating the fiscal liability, this issue of the tim Lng
of regulatory intervention is, however, secondary. The important question is when and
by how much does the true capital position of the bank go negative.
Instead of the fiscal liability of the government being determined at a single realization,
the government remains at risk throughout.  Whenever the net capital becomes negati, e.
the implicit "put" option which the government has sold on the bank will be, in effect,
exercised, and a fiscal liability crystallized.  (Indeed, even after one such crystallizaticaL,
the government will still be at risk for further failures.)  The natural theoretical pricing
model to use for such circurnstances is that of the option value.  We can characterize this
option value as the lump sum the government would have to pay in the world market t'
lay-off this risk.
Textbook option pricing methods are not obviously available to us in this environment
The capital value of the bank is not traded on capital markets (the shareholder's value
32may be, but this is bounded below by zero), and therefore the usual parameters of pricing
formulae are not available.  Furthermore, even if we were to construct approximations to
these parameters, the arbitrage assumptions underlying the pricing formulae are not valid.
However, we argue that this is not a fatal obstacle: a short-run expected value calculation
is, in the relevant circumstances, likely to provide a reasonably adequate approximation
to that part of the option value which is based on information about the current situation
of the banking system.  Two arguments support this: first, if that short-run expected value
liability is large, then the option is substantially "in the money", and therefore the option
value is approximately equal to the underlying asset value (zero exercise price).  Second,
the fact that the average maturity of the typical bank's portfolio is short, or at least
subject to recontracting means that more distant risks have not yet been assumed;
therefore, the appropriate provision now for the contribution of such risks to future fiscal
outlays should be limited by the adoption of improved regulatory procedures. 24
An additional provision could be made to take account of the longer-term risks.  But if so,
it should therefore be a standard one based not on the current position of the banking
system, but on characteristics such as the exogenous volatility facing the country, the
quality of regulation, etc.  As discussed in the text, there is as yet little empirical evidence
to indicate the size of such a provision or how it should vary by country characteristics.
Finally there is the question of supplementing expected value or option value of fiscal
liability with some measure of the range of uncertainty.  The natural measure here is
VAR, i.e. a lower percentile of the probability distribution of the projected liability.
2 4 As against this, it might be pointed out that a large majority of the countries in the world have had
significant banking sector problems over the past quarter century: how should we expect the next quarter-
century to be any better?
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